We o¤er an axiomatization of the serial cost-sharing method of Friedman and Moulin (1999) . The key property in our axiom system is Group Demand Monotonicity, asking that when a group of agents raise their demands, not all of them should pay less.
Introduction
Serial cost sharing was proposed by Moulin and Shenker (1992) as a method for allocating the cost of production of a single good among n agents. Friedman and Moulin (1999) generalized it to the context where each agent consumes a possibly di¤erent good: total cost varies with the consumption pro…le but need no longer be a function of the sum of the agents' consumptions. The problem is to allocate the cost C(x) generated by the demand pro…le x = (x 1 ; :::; x n ) on the basis of the knowledge of x and the information contained in the cost function C de…ned on R n + ; which is assumed to be nondecreasing, continuously di¤erentiable, and to display no …xed costs. This is the standard cost-sharing model developed by Billera and Heath (1982) , Mirman and Tauman (1982) , and Samet and Tauman (1982) . Assuming without loss of generality that x 1 x 2 ::: x n ; Friedman and Moulin's serial method charges agent i the integral of her marginal cost along the "constrained egalitarian path" made up of the line segments linking 0 to (x 1 ; :::; x 1 ) to (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x 2 ), and so on to x. This is an alternative to the better known method derived from the Aumann-Shapley (1974) value for nonatomic games, which integrates marginal costs along the diagonal from 0 to x: Département de Sciences Économiques and CIREQ, Université de Montréal, C.P. 6128, succursale centre-ville, Montréal H3C 3J7, Canada (yves.sprumont@umontreal.ca). Many thanks to Max Amarante, Eric Friedman, Sid Gordon and Hervé Moulin for useful discussions, and to three referees of this journal for valuable comments and suggestions. This research was supported by Canada's SSHRC and Québec's FQRSC. Friedman and Moulin (1999) proposed an axiomatization of their method. A key axiom in their work states that if all goods are perfect substitutes -that is, C(z) = c( P i2N z i )-then an agent's cost share should not exceed the cost of producing n times her own demand. This condition o¤ers a protection against the risk of paying an exceedingly high cost share because of the much higher demands of others. It is certainly in the original spirit of the serial method but remains perhaps too reminiscent of the very de…nition of the method to provide an independent justi…cation for it. In fact, the axiom rules out virtually all the popular cost-sharing methods. The only noticeable exception we are aware of is the so-called "cross-subsidizing serial method" of Moulin and Sprumont (2006) which di¤ers from the Friedman-Moulin method but retains its serial structure.
We o¤er an alternative axiomatization of the serial method which does not su¤er from the above criticism. The general normative principle motivating our choice of axioms is the one that underlies most of the theory of cost sharing: an agent should pay -fully but only-the fraction of the cost generated by her own demand 1 . Of course, unless the cost function is additively separable, this general principle is ambiguous. The challenge is to formulate unambiguous statements that capture the essential aspects of it.
In order to do that, we …nd it useful to break down an agent's in ‡uence on total cost into two components: the marginal cost function associated with the good she consumes and the size of her demand. If agents must be charged "the cost of their demand", then cost shares should somehow (a) be positively associated with marginal cost functions, (b) be positively associated with demand sizes, (c) be independent of any cost-irrelevant information. With one exception -Additivity-, our axioms are meant to be unambiguous statements interpreting these three desiderata. Of course, desideratum (b) is compelling only when each good is consumed by a clearly identi…able agent who can be held responsible for the entire demand of that good. That is the interpretation of the cost-sharing model we have in mind 2 . The …rst component of our axiom system is nothing more than the extension to the costsharing model of the system used by Shapley (1953) to characterize the value: Additivity (cost shares depend additively on the cost function), Dummy (an agent pays nothing if total cost never increases with her consumption), and Anonymity (the identity of an agent does not a¤ect what she pays). If Additivity is used for tractability -the world of nonadditive methods is virtually uncharted territory that we do not want to venture into-, the other two axioms follow naturally from desiderata (a) and (c) above. Dummy is a minimal expression of the view that cost shares should be positively related to marginal cost functions and Anonymity follows from the principle forbidding the use of cost-irrelevant information. As 1 There are contexts where this "full responsibility"principle is not warranted: see Moulin and Sprumont (2006) for a discussion and an alternative view.
2 A good example is the problem of allocating overhead costs among the various divisions of a large …rm (Shubik (1962) ). Desideratum (b) is not compelling when the demand for a given good results from the agregation of many small individual demands, as in the telephone pricing problem studied by Billera, Heath and Raanan (1978) and other applications of Aumann-Shapley pricing. a matter of fact, we do employ a strengthened version of the Dummy axiom requiring also that a change in the demand of a dummy agent should have no e¤ect on cost shares. This requirement too follows naturally from (c).
All these properties are well known and the serial method shares them with the other two central methods discussed in the literature, the Aumann-Shapley and Shapley-Shubik methods. Within the class delimited by Additivity, Anonymity and our strengthened version of the Dummy axiom, the Aumann-Shapley method is known to be the only one satisfying Scale Invariance (cost shares do not depend on the units in which consumptions are measured) and the property that cost shares are proportional to demands when goods are perfect substitutes. See Billera and Heath (1982) and Mirman and Tauman (1982) for details 3 . In the same class, the Shapley-Shubik method proposed by Shubik (1962) , is the only method satisfying Scale Invariance and Demand Monotonicity (an agent's cost share does not decrease when her demand goes up). See Friedman and Moulin (1999) . 4 The second component of our axiom system is Group Demand Monotonicity. Introduced by Moulin and Sprumont (2005) , this axiom says that when a group of agents raise their demands, not all of them should end up paying less. This is stronger than Demand Monotonicity but still follows naturally from desideratum (b). Group Demand Monotonicity is satis…ed by a number of well known methods that have nothing in common with the serial method, such as equal or proportional cost sharing.
We show that in conjunction with the properties forming the …rst component of our axiom system, Group Demand Monotonicity characterizes the serial method. The model, the axioms, and our theorem are presented in Section 2. That section also contains a brief sketch of the key ideas underlying the proof. The proof itself is given in Section 3. A discussion of our result and further comparison with related work is o¤ered in Section 4.
The model and the result
Let N = f1; :::; ng be a …nite set of agents, n 3: A cost function is a mapping C : R N + ! R + that is nondecreasing, continuously di¤erentiable, and satis…es C(0) = 0: The set of cost functions is denoted C. A demand pro…le is a point x 2 R N + . A (cost-sharing) method is a mapping ' which assigns to each (cost-sharing) problem (C; x) 2 C R N + a vector of nonnegative cost shares '(C; x) 2 R N + satisfying the budget balance condition
As is well known, this model can be reinterpreted as a surplus-sharing model: C is then viewed as a production function, x i is agent i's input contribution and ' i (C; x) is her share of the total output produced. All our axioms remain meaningful under this alternative interpretation. We maintain the cost-sharing interpretation throughout the rest of the paper to avoid confusion.
If C 2 C and i 2 N , we denote by @ i C(z) the ith partial derivative of C at z if z i > 0 and its ith right partial derivative at z if z i = 0: For all z; z 0 2 R N + , we let z^z 0 = (min(z 1 ; z 0 1 ); :::; min(z n ; z 0 n )): The (Friedman-Moulin) serial method is the costsharing method ' de…ned by
for all C 2 C, x 2 R N + , and i 2 N: This method reduces to the well known serial formula proposed by Moulin and Shenker (1992) in the particular case of perfectly substitutable goods. If there exists a function c :
; then, assuming without loss of generality that x 1 x 2 ::: x n ; the cost shares in (2.1)
+ :::+ c(x 1 +:::+xn) c(x 1 +:::+x n 2 +2x n 1 ) 1 : Just like the Aumann-Shapley method, the serial method belongs to the class of "path methods" (Friedman (2004) ). A path to x 2 R N + is a continuous nondecreasing function r x : [0; 1] ! [0; x] such that r x (0) = 0 and r x (1) = x: A cost-sharing method ' is a path method if to each x 2 R N + there is a path r x such that
for all C 2 C and i 2 N: Note that this expression is well de…ned because r x is di¤eren-tiable almost everywhere. The serial method is generated by the collection of "constrained egalitarian" paths r x (t) = (tx n ; tx n ; :::; tx n )^x whereas the Aumann-Shapley method is generated by the collection of "diagonal"paths r x (t) = tx.
We now present our axioms. The …rst four are adapted from the properties used by Shapley (1953) to characterize the value in the model of cooperative games.
Additivity. For all C; C 0 2 C and
As mentioned in the Introduction, our primary motivation for this axiom is tractability. Additive methods can be described fairly explicitly: Friedman and Moulin (1999) and Friedman (2004) o¤er characterizations of the class of additive methods satisfying the Dummy axiom and Moulin and Vohra (2003) propose a description of the entire class in the discrete version of the cost-sharing model. By comparison, only a few speci…c nonadditive rules were studied in the literature -see for instance Sprumont (1998) and Koster (2007) -and no general characterization result is available. Beyond tractability, however, the practical advantages of Additivity should not be underestimated. As many authors have noted, an additive method is easily implementable. When total cost arises from independent production processes, applying the method to the cost function corresponding to each process and adding the resulting cost shares is equivalent to applying it to the aggregated cost function. This guarantees that the proper level of application of the method is not a matter of dispute.
Following standard terminology, we call agent i a dummy (agent) if @ i C(z) = 0 for all z 2 R N + : The familiar Dummy axiom states that a dummy agent pays nothing: if @ i C(z) = 0 for all z 2 R N + ; then ' i (C; x) = 0 for all x 2 R N + : We replace this axiom by the two properties of Weak Dummy and Dummy Independence. The conjunction of these properties is stronger than Dummy.
Weak Dummy. For all C 2 C; x 2 R N + , and i 2 N; if x i = 0 and @ i C(z) = 0 for all z 2 R N + ; then ' i (C; x) = 0: Weak Dummy requires that a dummy agent who demands nothing pay nothing. This is an extremely weak axiom. If the statement that an agent should pay only the fraction of the cost generated by her own demand entails any well de…ned restriction on ', this must be one.
This axiom says that if total cost is independent of an agent's demand, then cost shares should also be. Together with Weak Dummy, Dummy Independence allows one to essentially ignore all dummy agents. This seems to be a very natural separability condition for a theory aiming at charging agents according to their own impact on total cost. Dummy Independence is satis…ed by all the popular cost-sharing methods proposed in the literature, including the Aumann-Shapley and Shapley-Shubik methods.
Within the class of methods satisfying Dummy, the axiom of Dummy Independence may also be defended from a strategic viewpoint. Indeed, a method satisfying Dummy and violating Dummy Independence would be vulnerable to manipulations by pairs consisting of a dummy and a non-dummy agent: an increase in the dummy agent's demand could reduce her partner's cost share without increasing her own.
Our fourth axiom uses the following notation. If i; j are two distinct agents, we denote by ij the permutation on N which exchanges i and j :
Anonymity. For all C 2 C, x 2 R N + ; and distinct i; j 2 N; if
This requirement expresses the familiar idea that the names of the agents should play no role in the computation of the cost shares. This is widely accepted as a very basic notion of fairness and is consistent with condition (c) in the Introduction: characteristics unrelated to the cost function or the demand pro…le should be ignored. Our formulation is rather weak insofar as it does not impose restrictions on the cost shares across demand pro…les, in contrast with the condition used in Sprumont (2008) for instance. On the other hand, our axiom does impose restrictions across cost functions; it is stronger than the requirement that agents with equal demands pay the same cost share when the cost function is symmetric in the goods they demand.
Our …fth axiom has no counterpart in Shapley's characterization of the value.
Group Demand Monotonicity. For all C 2 C, all x; x 0 2 R N + ; and all nonempty S N; if x i < x 0 i for all i 2 S and x i = x 0 i for all i 2 N nS, then there exists i 2 S such that
This axiom simply requires that when a group of agents jointly increase their demands, not all of them pay less. It strengthens Moulin's (1995) Demand Monotonicity axiom which only requires that if
. As already discussed, Group Demand Monotonicity is in line with the normative principle that cost shares should be positively related to demand sizes. We note that the axiom is also compelling from the strategic viewpoint: in an environment where agents can easily communicate, Group Demand Monotonicity is necessary to prevent manipulations by coordinated arti…cial in ‡ation of demands.
An interesting weak form of the axiom consists of restricting Group Demand Monotonicity to the groups containing no more than two agents. Combined with our …rst four axioms, this weaker requirement turns out to imply Group Demand Monotonicity: see Section 4 for a discussion.
Theorem. The following statement are equivalent: (i) ' is a cost-sharing method satisfying Additivity, Weak Dummy, Dummy Independence, Anonymity and Group Demand Monotonicity; (ii) ' is the serial cost-sharing method.
Observe that contrary to the classic axiomatizations of the Aumann-Shapley and ShapleyShubik methods, our theorem does not use any measurement invariance axiom. As is well known, the Friedman-Moulin serial method is not scale invariant. It is important to keep in mind that the method was proposed as an extension of the Moulin-Shenker formula for perfect substitutes and is meant to be used in problems where the goods, although no longer necessarily perfectly substitutable, remain genuinely comparable. In such environments, scale invariance is not compelling. See Friedman and Moulin (1999) for a list of examples including queueing and scheduling cost-sharing problems, as well as the outputsharing problem in a cooperative enterprise. Of course, the serial method is invariant to a change in the common unit in which the goods are measured 5 .
It is not di¢ cult to check that statement (ii) implies statement (i) but the proof of the converse implication is long. The remainder of this section o¤ers an informal overview of it. For simplicity, let us consider the three-agent case, N = f1; 2; 3g : Fix a method ' satisfying our axioms. Because ' satis…es Additivity and Dummy, a fundamental lemma in Friedman and Moulin (1999) guarantees that the cost shares are obtained by integrating marginal costs: for every demand pro…le x and every agent i; there exists a measure x 3 to be included in the (range of the) constrained egalitarian path to x: The bulk of the proof is devoted to establishing this fact in the particular case when all coordinates of the demand pro…le x coincide: the argument is developed in the …rst six steps of the proof and does not rely on Dummy Independence. The last two steps of the proof exploit Dummy Independence to establish the fact for an arbitrary demand pro…le x.
The heart of the proof is Step 2. Let a = (
3 ) denote the systems of measures which, according to the Friedman-Moulin lemma just described, generate '(:; a) and '(:; b): Consider two demand pro…les a = ( ; ; ) and b = ( ; ; ), where 0 < < : Suppose for a moment that ' is the Shapley-Shubik method: given a problem (C; x); each agent pays her Shapley value in the cooperative game (C;x) (S) = C(x S ; 0 N nS ) for all S N: Thus,
and
Suppose now that the cost function C is symmetric in z 1 ; z 2 and that its restriction to the …nite grid f0; ; g N is
and ' 3 (C; b) = 0 + 1 6
: But C(a) = C(b) = 1: Since C is symmetric in z 1 ; z 2 and ' is anonymous, we must have ' i (C; a) = 
, that we were able to …nd a cost function C; symmetric in z 1 ; z 2 and such that C(a) = C(b); for which ' 3 (C; a) < ' 3 (C; b). The anonymity of ' then precipitated the violation.
It should be clear that this argument extends beyond the particular case of the ShapleyShubik method.
Step 2 shows that whenever the measure Step 1 shows that it follows from Anonymity and Group Demand Monotonicity. The proof is similar to that of Step 2: assuming that ' is anonymous and that the projection property does not hold, we again exhibit a cost function e C such that ' i ( e C; a) > ' i ( e C; b)
The rest is tedious but rather straightforward.
Step 3 lets vary between 0 and : It follows immediately from Step 2 that the support of b 3 must in fact be included in the ray z 1 = z 2 = z 3 : The formal proof in Steps 4 to 6 relies on the rather cumbersome restrictions (identi…ed in Friedman and Moulin (1999) ) that budget balance entails on those measures.
Step 7 identi…es the key restriction that Dummy Independence imposes on the entire system of measures characterizing ': A simple argument shows that for any demand pro…le x = (x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ); the measures
must be the projections of
Step 8 concludes the proof. Since the supports of
are included in the egalitarian ray z 1 = z 2 = z 3 , the projection property established in Step 7 implies that the supports of ( ; ;0) 1 ; ( ; ;0) 2 are included in the ray z 1 = z 2 : As is well known, Demand Monotonicity (which follows from Group Demand Monotonicity) then implies that the supports of ( ; ;0) 1 ; ( ; ;0) 2 are included in the (range of the) constrained egalitarian path to ( ; ; 0) whenever 0 : A corresponding statement also holds for every permutation of ( ; ; 0): Invoking the projection property proved in Step 7 again, we conclude that the supports of
x 3 are included in the (range of the) constrained egalitarian path to x whenever 0 x b: This implies that ' must be the serial method.
The proof
Proof that (ii) implies (i). It is well known and easy to check that the serial method ' satis…es our …rst four axioms. To check Group Demand Monotonicity, …x a cost function C, a group of agents S N; and two demand pro…les x; x 0 such that x i < x 0 i for all i 2 S and x i = x 0 i for all i 2 N nS. We claim that the cost share of any agent with minimal demand in S at x cannot decrease when the demand pro…le changes from x to x 0 : Indeed, let i 2 S be such that x i x j for all j 2 S:
As noted in Moulin and Sprumont (2005) , this argument can be generalized to show that all "…xed-path methods" satisfy Group Demand Monotonicity. In our continuous framework, a …xed-path method is a path method generated by a collection of paths r x having the property that if
One can think of such a method as being generated by a single …xed "unbounded path"r. The serial method is a …xed-path method whereas the Aumann-Shapley method is not. To see why a …xed-path method ' is group demand monotonic, consider again a group S and two demand pro…les x; x 0 such that x i < x 0 i for all i 2 S and x i = x 0 i for all i 2 N nS. If the demand of agent i is among those in S that are reached …rst along the path r x (in the sense that t x (i) :
We now turn to the proof that only the serial method satis…es our axioms. The following notation will be used throughout. Vector inequalities are written ; <; . For all S N and z 2 R N we denote by z S 2 R S the restriction of z to S: If z; z 0 2 R N ; we denote by (z S ; z 0 N nS ) the point in R N whose restrictions to S and N n S are z S and z where the term "almost all" is understood with respect to the jSj-dimensional Lebesgue measure on 0; (x S ; 0 N nS ) : A useful implication of (3.1) (derived by taking S = fig) is that the projection of x i on the one-dimensional interval [0; x i ] is the Lebesgue measure:
Lemma (Friedman and Moulin, 1999) . For any function ' : C R N + ! R N + , the following statements are equivalent: (i) ' is a cost-sharing method satisfying Additivity and Dummy; (ii) there exists a measure system such that
The role of (3.1) is to guarantee that the cost shares de…ned by (3.3) satisfy budget balance. It may be useful to outline the argument in the case of a cost-sharing problem (C; x) where C is su¢ ciently di¤erentiable. For any set S = fi 1 ; :::; i S g N , denote by @ S C the partial derivative @ i 1 :::@ i S C: Compute the cost shares in (3.3) using repeated integration by parts: for any i 2 N;
where dz refers to the jSj-dimensional Lebesgue measure. Then Friedman and Moulin (1999) invoke an approximation to extend the proof to all cost-sharing problems.
The measure system in the Friedman-Moulin lemma is unique; we say that it generates ': We refer to x as a measure system at x. By the support of x we mean the union of the supports of the measures x 1 ; :::; x n . We denote by the measure system generating the serial method ' and call the serial measure system. This system is an example of a …xed measure system. In a …xed measure system ; when x x 0 ; each measure x i is the projection of
For any b = ( ; ; :::; ) 2 R N + , the support of the serial measure system b at b is the set f( ; ; :::; ) j 0 g, the diagonal of [0; b] : Using (3.2), it is easy to see that this property determines b uniquely, as noted in the proof of Theorem 2 in Friedman and Moulin (1999) . For any x b, the serial measure system at x is de…ned by the projection property
The support of x is the constrained egalitarian path to x. Suppose, without loss of generality, that x 1 x 2 ::: x n : For all i 2 N , de…ne the demand pro…le Proof that (i) implies (ii). Let ' be a cost-sharing method satisfying Additivity, Weak Dummy, Dummy Independence, Anonymity and Group Demand Monotonicity. Since Weak Dummy and Dummy Independence imply Dummy, it follows from the FriedmanMoulin lemma that there exists a measure system generating '. Let be a positive real number, …x the demand pro…le b = ( ; ; ; :::; ); and let B = [0; b] :
Step 1. We claim that if 0 < < ; and a = ( ; ; ; :::; ); then a i = p a b i for i = 3; :::; n:
Fix such that 0 < < ; let a = ( ; ; ; :::; ) and write A = [0; a]. We use the following terminology and notation set of open intervals, respectively. The set of intervals which are below the hyperplane z 1 = z 2 is E < = fE 2 E j z 2 < z 1 for all z 2 Eg; the set of intervals above it is E > = fE 2 E j z 2 > z 1 for all z 2 Eg; and the set of intervals whose endpoints are on this hyperplane is E = = fE 2 E j e 1 (E) = e 2 (E) and e + 1 (E) = e + 2 (E)g: 1.1. We claim that a i (E \ A) p a b i (E \ A) for i = 3; :::; n and all E 2 E o \ E < :
We only give a sketch of the argument and refer the reader to the Appendix for details. Fix E 2 E o \ E < and let e ; e + 2 R N ; e e + ; be the endpoints of E: Assume that Suppose now, by way of contradiction, that, say,
Assume also that 0 e 3 and e + 3
: this too is without loss of generality because
where we recall that 12 is the permutation exchanging agents 1 and 2; and let Z = Z [ 12 Z : this is the smallest superset of Z that is symmetric with respect to the hyperplane z 1 = z 2 :
Suppose we could construct a cost function C such that (a) C(a) = C(b); (b) C(z) is independent of z 4 ; :::; z n ; and (c) @ 3 C is a positive constant k on E \R N + and zero elsewhere. De…ne the function C on R N + by C (z) = C(z) if z 1 z 2 and C (z) = 12 C(z) otherwise. By Anonymity ' 1 (C; a)+' 2 (C; a) = ' 2 ( 12 C; a)+' 1 ( 12 C; a) and by Dummy ' i (C; a) = 0 = ' i ( 12 C; a) for i = 4; :::; n: Since C(a) = 12 C(a); budget balance implies 
where we recall that E f1;2g = f(z 1 ; z 2 ) j 9z 3 ; :::; z n : (z 1 ; z 2 ; z 3 ; :::; z n ) 2 Eg : See Figure 2 for an illustration. The only di¢ culty is that C is not a cost function: it is not continuously di¤erentiable or indeed even continuous. The formal proof in the Appendix involves approximating C by a sequence of cost functions.
We claim that
i (E \ A) for i = 3; :::; n and all E 2 E < : Let E 2 E < be an interval with endpoints e ; e + : Partition N into N <;< ; N <; ; N ;< ; N ; so that E = fz 2 R N j e i < z i < e i (E \ A) for i = 3; :::; n and all E 2 E = is also similar. When E 2 E = the function C in (3.9) is symmetric with respect to z 1 ; z 2 and C coincides with C: Assumption (3.6) guarantees that C(a) = C(b): The only change required in the formal proof in the Appendix is that the functions e C m satisfying (5.2) to (5.5) must now be symmetric with respect to z 1 ; z 2 : This causes no di¢ culty since E itself is symmetric with respect to z 1 ; z 2 . To conclude the proof of Step 1.3, it su¢ ces to note that every interval in E can be written as a disjoint union of intervals in E < ; E > and E = :
i (E \ A) for i = 3; :::; n and all E 2 E: Let E 2 E be an interval with endpoints e ; e + ; …x i 2 f3; :::; ng and assume without loss of generality that 0 e i and e
(3.10)
Partition G n E into the eight disjoint intervals G <;< = G 1 ; G =;< = G 2 ; G >;< = G 3 ; G <;= = G 4 ; G >;= = G 5 ; G <;> = G 6 ; G =;> = G 7 and G >;> = G 8 ; where G <;< = fz 2 G j z 1 < z 0 1 and z 2 < z 0 2 for all z 0 2 Eg; G =;< = fz 2 G j z 1 = z 0 1 for some z 0 2 E and z 2 < z 0 2 for all z 0 2 Eg; G >;< = fz 2 G j z 1 > z 0 1 and z 2 < z 0 2 for all z 0 2 Eg; and so on. By (3.10),
Since the opposite weak inequality holds by Step 1.3, we are done. Step 2. For any real number such that 0 < < ; partition B into B 0 ( ) = fz 2 B j z 1 ; z 2 g ; B 1 ( ) = fz 2 B j z 2 < < z 1 g ; B 2 ( ) = fz 2 B j z 1 < < z 2 g ; and B
3 ( ) = fz 2 B j ( ; ) < (z 1 ; z 2 )g: We claim that
)) = 0 for i = 3; :::; n:
The proof works by constructing a particular cost function C and applying Anonymity and Group Demand Monotonicity to the problems (C; a); (C; b): Although the construction of C is in essence rather simple, the requirement that it be continuously di¤erentiable introduces unavoidable minor complications. We begin by de…ning C on the set B = fz 2 B j z i = for i = 3; :::; ng: If z = (z 1 ; z 2 ; ; :::; ) 2 B; we abbreviate notation by writing z = (z 1 ; z 2 ):
Let s : R ! [0; 1] be a "smoothing function", namely, a nondecreasing, continuously di¤erentiable function such that s(0) = 0; s(1) = 1; and s 0 (0) = s 0 (1) = 0:
The level sets of this function are shown in Figure 3 . Observe that h( ; ) = 1 whenever 0 < : The function h is continuously di¤erentiable everywhere but at ( ; ); where it is discontinuous.
De…ne the functions C 1 ; C 2 : B ! [0; 1] by
Observe that C 1 (z) = C 2 (z) = 1 if z ( ; ) and C 1 ( ; ) = C 2 ( ; ) whenever 0 < : The functions C 1 ; C 2 are continuously di¤erentiable at every point, including ( ; ) where @ i C j ( ; ) = 0 for i; j 2 f1; 2g. Moreover, one checks that @ i C 1 ( ; ) = @ i C 2 ( ; ) for 0 < and i 2 f1; 2g : Partition the set B into B 01 ( ) = z 2 B j z 2 < z 1 ; B 02 ( ) = z 2 B j z 1 z 2 ; B 1 ( ) = z 2 B j z 2 < < z 1 ; B 2 ( ) = z 2 B j z 1 < < z 2 ; and B 3 ( ) = fz 2 B j ( ; ) < (z 1 ; z 2 )g:
Thanks to the properties of C 1 ; C 2 discussed above, C is continuously di¤erentiable and one checks that it is nondecreasing. The level sets of C are drawn in Figure 4 . Note that C(a) = C(b) = 1: Finally, with a slight abuse of notation, we extend C to R N + by letting From the de…nition of C; we have
For instance, if z 2 B 1 ( ); then @ a 3 C(z) = @ 3 C( ; z 2 ; z 3 ; :::; z n ) = 1 (n 2) C( ; z 2 ; ; :::; ) < 1 (n 2) C(z 1 ; z 2 ; ; :::; ) = @ 3 C(z): Therefore
that is, ' 3 (C; a) < ' 3 (C; b): Since C is symmetric in z 3 ; :::; z n and a 3 = ::: = a n = and b 3 = ::: = b n = ; Anonymity implies ' 3 (C; a) = ::: = ' n (C; a) and ' 3 (C; b) = ::: = ' n (C; b): Therefore ' i (C; a) < ' i (C; b) for i = 3; :::; n: Since C(a) = C(b); budget balance implies ' 1 (C; a) + ' 2 (C; a) > ' 1 (C; b) + ' 2 (C; b): But since C is symmetric in z 1 ; z 2 and a 1 = a 2 = and b 1 = b 2 = ; Anonymity also forces ' 1 (C; a) = ' 2 (C; a) and ' 1 (C; b) = ' 2 (C; b): Hence, ' 1 (C; a) > ' 1 (C; b) and ' 2 (C; a) > ' 2 (C; b); contradicting Group Demand Monotonicity.
Step 3. De…ne D 12 = fz 2 B j z 1 = z 2 g : We claim that Step 4. For all S N n 3 such that jSj 2; let D S = fz 2 B j z i = z j for all i; j 2 Sg :
Since the choice of agents 1 and 2 in Steps 1, 2 and 3 was arbitrary, this conclusion generalizes to
for all S N n 3 such that jSj = 2: (3.14)
For all S N n 3 such that jSj 2; de…ne b D S = fz 2 D S j z i 6 = z k for all i 2 S and all k 2 (N n 3) n Sg: Statement (3.14) implies
To see why, suppose there exists S N n 3 such that 2 jSj n 2 and
, contradicting (3.14). Notice that [ S N n3:jSj 2 D S = fz 2 B j 9i; j 2 N n 3 : i 6 = j and z i = z j g : Since for all S N n 3 such that jSj 2;
Using (3.14) and (3.15), it follows that Next, we establish a general property of the measure system that will be used in
Step 6. This property does not depend on the assumption that ' satis…es Anonymity and Group Demand Monotonicity; it is implied by (3.3) and (3.1).
Step 5. For any real number such that 0 < < ; de…ne E 3+ ( ) = fz 2 B j z 3 > z j for all j 2 N n 3g and E 3 ( ) = fz 2 B j z 3 < z j for all j 2 N n 3g: We claim that
and if
This is illustrated in Figure 6 . We prove (3.16) and leave the similar proof of (3.17) to the reader. If i 2 N and P is a property that points of B may have, we abbreviate notation by writing 
and z 3 t 3 )) = lim "!0 1 " b 3 (z i < 0 for i 2 N n3 and t 3 z 3 < t 3 + ") = m g for k = 1; 2; :::; we have 3.22) that is, the support of
We consider the case where
a completely similar argument (using (3.17) instead of (3.16)) leads to a similar contradiction.
For k = 1; 2; :::; de…ne D N n3
Let be a …nite subset of [0; ] such that
where, as in Step 5, E 3+ ( ) = fz 2 B j z 3 > z j for all j 2 N n 3g : For instance, we may choose = : From (3.23) and (3.24) follows that there exists 2 such that b 3 (E 3+ ( )) > 0: By (3.16) in Step 5, there must exist some i 2 N n 3 such that
Since the choice of agents 1 and 2 in Step 1 and the choice of agent 3 in Steps 4 and 5 was arbitrary, an equation analogous to (3.13) holds for agent i as well, namely, o j E \ X(12) 6 = ; and E \ X(12) 6 = ; :
Step 7. We claim that for all E 2 E o x (12);
Let e e + be such that E =]e ; e + [. Since E \ X(12) 6 = ;; we have e + i > 0 for i = 1; 2: De…ne e i+ = max(e i ; 0): For m = 3; 4; :::; let
Fix a real number k > 0 and let (C m ) m=3;4;::: be a sequence of cost functions such that, for all m, (a) C m (z) is independent of z 3 ; :::; z n ; (b) Figure 8 for an illustration. Then,
Since lim m!1 (12)) and lim m!1
Since ' 1 (:; x(12)) and ' 1 (:; x) are continuous (because they are of the form given in (3.3)), it follows that
A completely similar argument shows that
Step 8. We conclude the proof. is included in fz 2 B(12) j z 1 = z 2 g; the diagonal of B(12): Then (3.27) follows because of (3.2) and because b i (12) = 0 for i = 3; :::; n.
Fix a real number such that 0
< and let x = ( ; ; 0; :::; 0): We claim that
Because Group Demand Monotonicity implies Demand Monotonicity, ' 1 (C; x) ' 1 (C; b (12)) for all C 2 C: As Friedman and Moulin (1999) show (see Step 3 of the proof of their Theorem 1), this implies that 8.3. Let x be an arbitrary demand pro…le such that 0 x b: For any two distinct i; j 2 N; let x(ij) = (x fi;jg ; 0 N nfi;jg ): Since the choice of agents 1; 2 in Steps 7, 8.1, and 8.2 was arbitrary, (3.26) and (3.28) generalize:
Since these two facts hold for all distinct i; j 2 N; the support of x must equal S x , the support of x de…ned in (3.5). Because of (3.2), any measure system at x whose support equals S x coincides with x : Thus x = x : Since is arbitrary, we conclude that = ; hence ' = ' :
Discussion
(1) The only other existing axiomatization of the Friedman-Moulin serial method in the continuous cost-sharing model is Theorem 2 in Friedman and Moulin (1999) , which states that the serial method is characterized by Additivity, Dummy, Demand Monotonicity, and Upper Bound for Homogenous Goods. This last axiom says that if C(z) = c( P i2N z i ), then ' i (C; x) C(x i ; :::; x i ) for all x 2 R N + and i 2 N: We already discussed the limitations of this axiomatization in the Introduction.
In the discrete version of the cost-sharing model (that is, when demands are integers and the cost function is de…ned over N N ) Moulin and Sprumont (2006) o¤er an axiomatization of the (proper reformulation of the) Friedman-Moulin serial method based on Distributivity. That property states that the cost-sharing method should commute with the composition of cost functions. It is a technical axiom akin to Additivity with no clear normative or strategic interpretation. By contrast, Group Demand Monotonicity is meaningful on both counts.
Still in the discrete framework, Sprumont (2008) studies a combination of axioms very closely related to the one we use. The main di¤erence is that his axiom of Independence of Dummy Changes is strictly stronger than the combination of Weak Dummy and Dummy Independence, as the example of the Aumann-Shapley method shows. Moreover, his version of Anonymity is stronger than ours. In spite of this, Sprumont's (2008) axioms fail to uniquely characterize the serial method: they circumscribe the class of so-called "nearly serial"methods. The use of the continuous framework allows us to obtain a much crisper result.
(2) Building upon results derived by Haimanko (2000a and 2000b) in the model of nonatomic games, Friedman (2004) proposes a description of the methods satisfying Additivity and Dummy which constitutes an interesting alternative to the one given by (3.3) and (3.1). He shows that at any demand pro…le x, any such method can be expressed as an average of the "path methods at x". Formally, if x 2 R N + , denote by R x the set of paths to x: If i 2 N and (C;
This mapping associates with every path r x to x the cost share paid by agent i in the problem (C; x) according to the path formula generated by r x . Friedman (2004) proves that if a method ' satis…es Additivity and Dummy, then for every x 2 R N + there is a measure x on R x such that
We refer the reader to the original paper for the measure-theoretic details.
This characterization is more compact and intuitive than the Friedman-Moulin characterization in terms of measure systems. It could lead to a simpler proof of our theorem (avoiding the tedious Steps 4 to 6) and, as we suggest in comment 4 below, could also prove useful to analyze non-anonymous methods.
(3) The axioms used in our theorem are independent. (a) A cost-sharing method satisfying all our axioms but Additivity is equal sharing among the non-dummy agents: given a problem (C; x); let N (C) = fi 2 N j 9z 2 R N + g :
(b) A method violating only Weak Dummy is plain egalitarianism, ' i (C; x) = C(x)=n: (c) A simple example of a method violating only Dummy Independence is proportionality: ' i (C; x) = x i C(x)= P j2N x j if x > 0 and ' i (C; 0) = 0: This method, however, violates Dummy. For an example that also satis…es Dummy, combine the serial method with the Shapley-Shubik method as follows: let ' i (C; x) = ' i (C; x) if jfj 2 N j x j > 0gj 3 and ' i (C; x) = ' SS i (C; x) otherwise, where we recall that the Shapley-Shubik method ' SS charges agent i her Shapley value in the "standalone game" (C;x) (S) = C(x S ; 0 N nS ) for all S N: This method satis…es Group Demand Monotonicity because the Shapley-Shubik method satis…es Demand Monotonicity.
Albeit quite reasonable, Dummy Independence is an axiom that dramatically reduces the set of admissible methods. It would be interesting to know whether it can be relaxed.
Observe that the method described in the previous paragraph is not a continuous function of the demand pro…le. Continuity at Zero, which states that for all (C; x) 2 C R N + and all i 2 N; lim x i !0 '(C; (x i ; x N ni )) = '(C; (0 i ; x N ni )); allowed Friedman and Moulin (1999) to dispense with Dummy Independence in their characterization of the so-called randomorder methods. It is therefore tempting to conjecture that the combination of Dummy and Continuity at Zero could replace the combination of Weak Dummy and Dummy Independence in our theorem. This is not the case. Suppose N = f1; 2; 3g : For any (C; x) 2 C R N + ; let x = (min(x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ); min(x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ); min(x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 )) and de…ne C x 2 C by C x (z) = C(x + z) C(x): The method ' i (C; x) = ' i (C; x) + ' SS i (C x ; x x) satis…es Additivity, Dummy, Continuity at Zero, Anonymity and Group Demand Monotonicity. This last axiom is satis…ed because the Shapley-Shubik method is demand-monotonic and because at most two agents demand a quantity higher than the smallest demand. It is unclear whether similar examples can be constructed when there are more than three agents.
(d) For a method violating only Anonymity, consider any …xed-path method (as de…ned in the second paragraph of Section 3) other than the serial method: the simplest example is the so-called incremental method ' i (C; x) = (C;x) (f1; :::; ig) (C;x) (f1; :::; i 1g): (e) Finally, the Aumann-Shapley and Shapley-Shubik methods are examples of methods violating only Group Demand Monotonicity.
(4) We conjecture that the …xed-path methods are the only methods satisfying Additivity, Weak Dummy, Dummy Independence and Group Demand Monotonicity.
It is not di¢ cult to see that a nondegenerate convex combination of two …xed-path methods cannot be group demand monotonic. Here is a sketch of the argument in the three-agent case. Let r; r 0 be two …xed increasing unbounded paths in R N + and let ' r ; ' r 0 be the methods they generate: for each demand pro…le x, the paths to x used to compute the cost shares are the projections of r and r 0 on [0; x] ; which we write r x and r 0 x : Let ' = ' r + (1 )' r 0 ; where 0 < < 1: Because the two paths r; r 0 are di¤erent, there exists a demand pro…le x at which the order in which the individual demands x 1 ; :::; x n are reached along the path r x di¤ers from the order in which they are reached along r 0 x : To be more precise, write, for each x 2 R N + and i 2 N , t x (i) := inf ft j (r x ) i (t) x i g and t 0 x (i) := inf ft j (r 0 x ) i (t) x i g : There must exist some demand pro…le x and two agents, say, 1 and 2; such that
This is shown in Figure 9 . The …gure illustrates the case where t x (1) < t x (2) < t x (3) and t 0 x (2) < t 0 x (1) < t 0 x (3) but the order in which x 3 is reached relative to x 1 and x 2 is unimportant. Let a(i) = r x (t x (i)) and a
2 ; x 3 ); where x 0 i > x i for i = 1; 2: Let C be a cost function such that (i) @ 1 C is positive everywhere along the path r 0 x between a 0 (2) and a 0 (1) except in a neighborhood of a 0 (2) (where it is zero), (ii) @ 2 C is positive everywhere along the path r x between a(1) and a(2) except in a neighborhood of a(1); but (iii) both @ 1 C and @ 2 C (but not @ 3 C) are zero everywhere along the path r x 0 between a(1) and x 0 as well as along the path r 0 x 0 between a 0 (2) and x 0 . Then (2) tx(1)
a violation of Group Demand Monotonicity. A possible proof of our conjecture would exploit the Friedman (2004) characterization of Additivity and Dummy discussed in comment 2. The main di¢ culties would be (i) to show that every method satisfying Additivity, Weak Dummy, Dummy Independence and Group Demand Monotonicity can be written as a convex combination of …xed-path methods and (ii) to extend the argument above to arbitrary convex combinations of …xed-path methods, including the uncountable ones.
(5) Group Demand Monotonicity may be replaced in the statement of our theorem with the weaker requirement that members of groups of size one or two cannot all lower their cost shares by jointly raising their demands. This is because our proof does not use the full power of the axiom. Group Demand Monotonicity is employed in Steps 1, 2, and 8. Steps 1 and 2 only use the restriction of the condition to groups of two agents while Step 8 only uses its restriction to single agents. Of course, Demand Monotonicity could not replace Group Demand Monotonicity: numerous demand-monotonic methods, including the Shapley-Shubik method, satisfy our …rst four axioms.
(6) One can think of axioms of responsiveness to marginal costs that would strengthen Dummy. One very natural requirement would stipulate that if the marginal cost function associated with an agent increases, that agent should not end up paying less: if
This property is automatically satis…ed by every additive method satisfying Dummy, including the serial method, because of the Friedman-Moulin lemma (see formula (3.3)).
In the same spirit of cost responsiveness, Young (1985) proposed a powerful condition dubbed Symmetric (Cost) Monotonicity: if
The fact, proved by Young, that only the Aumann-Shapley method possesses this property illustrates the trade-o¤ existing between the fundamental desiderata of responsiveness to marginal costs and responsiveness to demand sizes. In our interpretation of the cost-sharing model where each good is consumed by a clearly identi…able agent, Symmetric Monotonicity is not compelling because average cost shares have no particular ethical relevance.
(7) One can also think of axioms of responsiveness to demand size that would strengthen Group Demand Monotonicity. One such property is Strong Group Demand Monotonicity: the sum of the cost shares of the agents in a group should not decrease when they jointly raise their demands. This condition is violated by the serial method 6 . In fact, one can show (by adapting the arguments in Moulin and Sprumont (2005) to our continuous model) that no additive method satis…es Strong Group Demand Monotonicity and Dummy. This fact is another illustration of the trade-o¤ between cost responsiveness and demand responsiveness within the class of additive methods. It also shows how restrictive Additivity is. Indeed, it is easy to construct non additive methods satisfying Dummy and Strong Group Demand Monotonicity: equal sharing among the non-dummy agents is a very simple example; it actually satis…es the condition that none of the agents who jointly raise their demands pays less.
Appendix
We provide the proof of the claim made in Step 1.1. To do so, we begin by constructing a sequence of continuous functions C m approximating the function C in (3.9). Recall that See Figure 12 . Because of (5.1), the sequence (C m ) m=3;4;::: converges pointwise to the function C de…ned in (3.9).
The functions C m are not continuously di¤erentiable. Our next step consists in smoothing them o¤. We begin by slightly modifying them to obtain functions that are continuously di¤erentiable in z 3 . Let k be a large positive real number. For m = 3; 4; :::; let f m : R + ! [0; 1] be a continuously di¤erentiable nondecreasing function such that (a) f m (z 3 ) = z Note that E(C; ) = E : Let ( e C m ) m=3;4;::: be a sequence of cost functions satisfying the following conditions: The construction of such a sequence causes no di¢ culty: see Figure 13 for an illustration. We make two sets of claims regarding this sequence. First,
where C is given in (3.9). To see why this is true, check …rst, using (5.4) and the continuity of the cost functions e C m ; that for all 2 [0; 1] ; fz 2 E j e C m (z) = g ! E in the Hausdor¤ metric. This in turn implies, using the continuity of the cost functions again, that for all z 2 E; e C m (z) ! C(z): Combining this with (5.2) and the fact that C m ! C pointwise yields (5.6).
Second, we claim that each cost function e C m has properties similar to C: Speci…cally, (a) e C m (a) = e C m (b); (b) e C m (z) is independent of z 4 ; :::; z n ; and (c) @ 3 e C m is a positive constant on a set e E( e C m ) which tends to E \ R N + as m grows, and zero outside E \ R need not be a cost function because it may fail to be di¤erentiable when z 1 = z 2 : However, it is straightforward to construct a cost function e C m;m which (a) coincides with e C m whenever jz 1 z 2 j < 1 m ; (b) is symmetric in z 1 ; z 2 ; (c) is independent of z 4 ; :::; z n , and (d) is such that @ 3 e C m;m (z) = 0 for all z = 2 E: For m large enough, (3.7) and (5.9) guarantee that Because of (5.6), e C m;m ! C pointwise. Hence, since ' 3 (:; a) and ' 3 (:; b) are continuous (by (3.3)), there exists m such that ' 3 ( e C m;m ; a) ' 3 ( e C m;m ; b) < 0: As in the sketch of the argument at the beginning of Step 1.1, budget balance, Dummy, and Anonymity now imply that ' i ( e C m;m ; a) > ' i ( e C m;m ; b) for i = 1; 2; contradicting Group Demand Monotonicity.
